Here's Johnny: a methodology for developing attacker personas. by Atzeni, Andrea et al.
ATZENI, A., CAMERONI, C., FAILY, S., LYLE, J. and FLÉCHAIS, I. 2011. Here's Johnny: a methodology for developing 
attacker personas. In Proceedings of the 6th International conference on availability, reliability and security (ARES 






© 2011 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other 
uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or 
promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of 
any copyrighted component of this work in other works. 
This document was downloaded from 
https://openair.rgu.ac.uk 
Here's Johnny: a methodology for developing 
attacker personas. 
ATZENI, A., CAMERONI, C., FAILY, S., LYLE, J. and FLÉCHAIS, I. 
2011 
Here’s Johnny: a Methodology for Developing Attacker Personas
Andrea Atzeni, Cesare Cameroni




Shamal Faily, John Lyle, Ivan Flechais




Abstract—The adversarial element is an intrinsic part of the
design of secure systems, but our assumptions about attackers
and threat is often limited or stereotypical. Although there
has been previous work on applying User-Centered Design on
Persona development to build personas for possible attackers,
such work is only speculative and fails to build upon recent
research. This paper presents an approach for developing
Attacker Personas which is both grounded and validated by
structured data about attackers. We describe a case study
example where the personas were developed and used to
support the development of a Context of Use description for
the EU FP7 webinos project.
Keywords-Persona, Attacker, Toulmin Model, Attack Tree;
I. INTRODUCTION
A distinguishing feature of secure software engineering
is the need for design activities to factor in the adversarial
element. Techniques such as Attack Trees [1] and Misuse
Cases [2] were devised to encourage such thinking by re-
framing system design from the perspective of an attacker.
In both cases, the steps carried out by an attacker are
modelled and form the basis of threats. Attack Trees model
the different paths that an attacker might take when carrying
out an attack, while Misuse Cases can be used both to
describe how Use Cases can be threatened, and how Use
Cases might mitigate particular Misuse Cases.
A hitherto undiscussed weakness of threat modelling
approaches is that we do not know, with the certainty that we
would like, precisely who these attackers are. To understand
why this might be important, we need to consider the process
for building such models. Sindre and Opdahl [2] suggest
that data contributing to these models can be derived by
brainstorming activities guided by a security expert; they
argue that this mirrors the way attackers think. However,
there is little certainty that the abstractions that we hold
about a system are necessarily the same as those held by an
attacker. The perceptions held by attackers may be coloured
by their own experiences, motivations, and capabilities; these
allow attackers to see system vulnerabilities that we, as
designers, are unable to see. With this in mind, Schneier
acknowledges that, for attack tree modelling to work, attack
trees need to be married with knowledge about an attacker
[1]. Without grounded information about attackers, we may
fall foul of our own stereotypes about who a system’s
attackers are, and what capabilities they have. For example,
attempting to mitigate against attacks precipitated by a
super-hacker may lead to design decisions which are overly
cautious in light of the risks the system does actually face.
In the “Why Johnny can’t encrypt” study on usability
problems with encryption software, Whitten and Tygar [3]
suggest that security needs a usability standard that is
different from those applied to ‘general consumer software’.
Sasse et al. [4] rebut this claim by demonstrating that with
proper application of standard HCI methods, usability issues
in security can be addressed. To better focus on the goals
and characteristics of adversaries, Steele & Jia [5] proposed
using User-Centered Design techniques to develop personas
describing the archetypical behaviour of possible attackers.
Two key characteristics of such techniques are an early focus
on users and the tasks they carry out, and the empirical
measurement of activities carried out by users [6]. Although
this proposition is intriguing, it remains speculative; we
are unaware of existing work attempting to develop such
attacker models based on these principles.
In this paper, we show that in addition to helping with
usability issues, HCI techniques can help improve system se-
curity. We demonstrate this by presenting a methodology for
developing Attacker Personas: behavioural specifications of
archetypical attackers of a system. In section II we describe
the related work that the Attacker Persona methodology
builds upon before presenting the methodology in section
III. In section IV, we present an illustrative example of how
Attacker Personas were developed and applied to develop a
Context of Use description for the EU FP7 webinos project.
II. RELATED WORK
A. Threat and Attacker Taxonomies
Risk analysis and management plays a central role in
designing information security in medium to large sys-
tems. A common pre-requisite in risk-based approaches to
secure system design, such as [7] is the elicitation and
categorisation of threats; these cause unwanted incidents
leading to harm to a system or organisation [8]. These
approaches are somewhat unclear about how to characterise
threats with qualitative and quantitative data. Even with
rich taxonomies of possible threats, these need to be cus-
tomised to the environments where they are to be applied.
For example, the Common Attack Pattern Enumeration
and Classification (CAPEC) initiative has described attack
patterns describing methods of exploiting software from an
attacker’s perspective [9]. One such pattern is a Reflection
Attack which describes how an attacker exploits a security
protocol weakness to obtain unauthorised access to a server.
Assuming that an attacker satisfied the prerequisites for this
attack, CAPEC claims that the likelihood of this attack is
High, but this rating may be meaningless. For an unskilled
attacker, the pre-requisites may be sufficiently daunting that
the likelihood of a mounting a successful attack might be
low. Similarly, a skilled attacker may not be interested in
exploiting the system being designed, thereby making the
attack likelihood equally low.
There are two possible sources of data from which
detailed models can be derived. The first of these is an
appropriate taxonomy of possible attackers. Unfortunately,
the lack of data upon which to ground a taxonomy means
there has been comparatively little work in this area. One
notable exception has been work carried out by the Open
Web Application Security Project (OWASP) towards the
modelling of threat agents [10]. OWASP defines a Threat
Agent as an individual or group that manifests a threat. Sev-
eral categories of human threat agent have been proposed;
these include employees, unintentional and intentional hu-
man agents. In particular, OWASP defines specific attacker
agents for corporate intranet attackers, and external Internet
attackers such as script kiddies and professional crackers.
The OWASP definition for threat agents includes infor-
mation about the agent’s capabilities, intentions, and past
activities, but there is little information about these on the
OWASP portal even though this information is essential for
grounding attacker models. A more detailed breakdown of a
threat agent has been proposed by Jones & Ashenden; they
have identified several factors that influence attackers behind
malicious threats; these include motivation, the capability
of an individual, opportunities for carrying out an attack,
catalysts that cause an agent to select a target, and system
related factors such as vulnerabilities and high-value assets
[11].
Eliciting these factors for different threat agents may also
lead to the elicitation of possible attacker characterisation.
For this reason, it may be useful, as [5] suggests, to
consider the usefulness of User-Centered Design artifacts
for embodying these characteristics.
B. Personas and Assumption Personas
Personas are behavioural specifications of archetypical
users. These were first introduced by Cooper [12] as a
means of dealing with programmer biases arising from the
word user. These biases lead to programmers introducing
assumptions, bending and stretching the supposed user to
meet these needs; Cooper called this phenomena ”designing
for the elastic user”. Cooper’s solution was to design for a
single user representing the target segment of the system or
product being designed. This approach brings two benefits.
First, designers only have to focus on those requirements
necessary to keep the target persona happy. Second, the
idiosyncratic detail associated with personas makes them
communicative to a variety of stakeholders. Personas were
designed to be data-driven artifacts; they are grounded in
empirical data collected about representative users who carry
out work within their normal contexts of use. For the purpose
of creating attacker personas, it is perhaps unsurprising
that we cannot easily elicit empirical data directly from
attackers. Secondary sources of publicly accessible Open
Source Intelligence data on the Internet may, however, act
as a suitable proxy given that the purpose of using personas
is to articulate attacker viewpoints or explore possible attack
ideas.
Assumption Personas are persona sketches created to
articulate existing assumptions about a user population [13].
Rather than being based on observed data of prospective
users, these are grounded in assumptions that contribu-
tors hold about users and the context of investigation.
These assumptions may be derived from interpreted or mis-
interpreted experiences, and coloured by individual and
organisational values. Assumption Personas can help people
to see the value of personas in design, and how different
assumptions can shape these. As a result, when exposed,
they guide subsequent analysis or data collection for data-
driven personas.
C. Arguing Assumption Personas
Recent work by Faily and Fléchais [14] demonstrated how
approaches from Design Rationale can be used to structure
the contributions made by assumptions towards personas.
They propose associating the narrative structure pertaining
to personas with a number of characteristics acting as
propositions about the persona. As such, the persona is
written to satisfy these characteristics, which are analogous
to claims that might be made as part of an argument. These
characteristics may be backed up as references: propositions
which act as the grounds of evidence. References may also
act as a warrant or a rebuttal to a characteristic. A warrant
is a rule of inference describing how grounds contribute to
the characteristic. The origin of a warrants assumption is
the backing knowledge for believing the claim. A rebuttal
challenges the validity of the claim. Each characteristic is
also supplemented by a modal qualifier indicates the degree
of certainty about the claim. This persona argumentation
model is based on Toulmin’s model of argumentation [15]
This argumentation model may be invaluable for ground-
ing attacker-based personas because it not only explicates the
origins of assumptions about attackers, but it also presents
the claims made by a persona developer argumentatively.
Consequently, this allows attacker personas to be revised
in light of alternative perspectives about attackers and their
capabilities and motives.
III. APPROACH
The attacker personas we developed are similar to as-
sumption personas presented in the literature. However in-
stead of being based on the assumptions of stakeholders in
a design situation, they are based on various sources of data
regarding the types of people who have been known to attack
systems. These personas can be used to inform other attack
description analysis, notably attack trees as section IV-E will
describe. In order to enable the detailed analysis necessary
for the creation of attacker personas, we used the CAIRIS
[16] tool to support, document and manage the process. The
following sections describe the methodology used to build
attacker personas.
A. Data Source selection
The first stage involves identifying possible sources of
data from which attacker personas can be derived. This
data source discovery exercise must be informed by pre-
existing knowledge about the problem domain the system
will be situated in, together with existing open-source threat
taxonomies.
B. Reference elicitation
The data sources must then be analysed on a sentence-
by-sentence basis to identify assumptions or claims being
made about prospective attackers, and their interest in the
operational environment. These assumptions are not elicited
verbatim from the text, instead they need to be inferred from
the fragments of behaviour that can be reasonably assumed.
C. Affinity diagramming
In the process of culling references from the source
material, analysts can then establish some ideas of their own
about the kind of attacker they are referring to. To make sure
their assumptions do not unduly bias their analysis, sense-
making activities are carried out to draw characteristics
about the assumption data which, by this stage, is little
more than a collection of unrelated references about a user.
This activities involve carrying out an affinity diagramming
exercise [17], where each reference is written on a post-
it note and stuck on a white board. Following this, 2 -
3 people work through the large, un-organised cluster of
notes, identifying similar traits in order to form affinity
clusters representing different facets of attacker behaviour.
This clustering is an interactive process, with participants
asking for clarification about what notes mean, discussing
the nature of different clusters, and moving notes around.
As these clusters appear and became stable, these are then
labelled with a concept or phrase describing the affinity
cluster, which is represented using a different coloured post-
it note.
Not all references may fall under any particular category,
and these are kept clustered in an Unknown category. In
the next step of developing characteristics for the persona,
a possible category for these references sometimes becomes
apparent, or, alternatively, references which had fallen under
one existing category occasionally become redundant and
are reclassified into the Unknown category.
Based on the number and variety of the references, it can
be unrealistic to proceed on the assumption that a only single
persona will be developed. Consequently, the following steps
D and E can still be followed with the aim of creating
multiple personas instead of a single one.
D. Characteristic development
This stage moves from identifying clusters of user be-
haviour, to developing the characteristics of the persona.
Assumptions about personal attributes, such as age and
gender, are noted based on indications from the affinity clus-
ters. Following this, individual persona characteristics are
developed to correspond to each behavioural cluster. These
characteristics are structured according to the argumentation
model described in section II-C. These characteristics can be
entered into CAIRIS, together with the grounds, warrants,
and rebuttals which form the basis of the argumentation
model. This allows the visual argumentation models of each
persona characteristic to be generated automatically.
E. Author Persona
The final step involves writing a narrative for the per-
sonas. This begins by developing a skeleton structure for
the persona based on the elicited characteristics. Following
this structure, the narrative is then written to describe the
persona in a more engaging manner. This step involves some
creativity, however, it must always be bounded and informed
by the characteristics themselves.
IV. CASE STUDY: webinos
The Secure Web Operating System Application Delivery
Environment (webinos) is defining and delivering an open
source platform which will enable web applications and
services to be used and shared consistently and securely over
a broad spectrum of converged devices, including mobile,
PC, home media (TV) and in-car units. From the outset
of the project, security and privacy will be designed into
webinos. The convergence of a large number of different
devices (mobile, pc, home media and in-car units) and
an increasingly broad and eclectic user base provides new
opportunities for attackers to exploit digital assets. These
new opportunities for device and application convergence
have also led to growing awareness of the importance of
users to better control their privacy when interacting with
online services.
We developed several attacker personas – summarised
in table I – to embody a set of possible threat sources
Name Synopsys
David 3rd party maintenance operator, with physical device access.
Frankie Unskilled script kiddie, with access to public domain tools.
Ethan Semi-professional spammer and botnet herder.
Gary Irrational (ex) staff member, with un-revoked system access.
Harold Skilled Grey-Hat cracker.




which help to explore and understand the security and
privacy issues that affect the users, environments and tasks
associated with webinos. These were developed and applied
to supplement a Context of Use description for the webi-
nos project. The Context of Use description provides the
background necessary to evaluate the usability of a system,
and includes characteristics of the intended users, the tasks
they perform, the system’s goals, and information about the
environment in which users are to use the system [18]. More
conventional personas and scenario-based task descriptions
were developed as part of this context of use description. In
particular, the conventional personas were developed using
a similar methodology to that described in this paper, i.e.
the persona narrative was based on a selection of argued
characteristics.
We now describe how the methodology presented in
section III was used, and focus our attention mostly on one
particular attacker persona: Irwin. Other attacker personas
are described in the webinos official deliverable [19].
A. Data Source selection and Reference elicitation
The attacker personas were developed with the following
criteria in mind:
• They should be representative of known attacker
classes;
• They should be representative of criminals convicted
for common online crimes;
• They should be situated within the context of webinos.
The attacker personas were chosen to be representative of
OWASP human threat agents. To mitigate the risk of devel-
oping irrational attacker models, we chose not to model rare
but possibly very dangerous attackers, such as government or
organised-crime sponsored professional hackers, for which
accurate information is not generally available.
We gathered web resources that record judgments, pleas
and sentences, clustered similar references, and selected
significant examples; these provided information about how
the attacker personas might behave. This was supplemented
by other OWASP data, and anecdotal data from security
domain experts on the webinos project team. This data was
analysed and summarised into factoids. Between 20 and
50 factoids for each candidate persona were derived. In
the case of Irwin, we elicited 23 factoids ranging from
personal attitudes to cognitive capabilities. For example,
from the excerpt “He is described by friends as having
a quiet sense of humour.” we elicited “He has a quiet
sense of humour”. Similarly, from the statement “A Rutgers
professor ... described him ... as one of the brightest students
... He was also ambitious and driven and, by the way,
an excellent competitive ballroom dancer” we elicited the
reference “He was a bright student, ambitious and driven”.
Each elicited factoid was entered into CAIRIS as a
reference.
B. Affinity diagramming
Because the process was sensitised by attacker expec-
tations and models, affinity modelling was essential for
filtering out unrealistic facts about the attacker. Using a
white-board, we transcribed all elicited factoids onto post-it
notes, and progressively clustered and de-clustered factoids
until a partially disjoint set of 10 clusters was identified. The
list below describes some of the criteria that represents each
of these emergent categories:
• What kind of unauthorised behaviour might the attacker
be inclined to do?
• What kind of assets does the inside attacker manage in
an organisation?
• How much does the attacker respect agreements and
contracts?
• How much knowledge can the attacker gain of the
organization’s security posture?
• How much can the attacker exploit his colleague’s
propensity for insecure behaviour?
C. Characteristic development
After affinity diagramming, the clusters were used to form
the basis of more detailed, individual characteristics of the
attacker persona. For example, the cluster relating to How
much does the attacker respect agreements and contracts?
formed the basis of the characteristic Irwin does not respect
contracts.
As figure 1 illustrates, the factoids associated with each
cluster formed the grounds and, in one case, the warrant
for the claims made by these characteristics. The modal
qualifiers, i.e. Always and Presumably were based on the
confidence in the behavioural cluster and the used data. In
particular, they reflect how frequent and realistic the relation
between the cluster and its respective claim are, as well as
the reliability of the data source. Once these characteristics
had been drafted, each was associated with a behavioural
variable type. These types were based on the model of
possible behavioural variable types proposed by [12], i.e.
Activities, Attitudes, Aptitudes, Motivation and Skills.
A new persona object was created in CAIRIS, and each
respective characteristic was associated with it; the grounds





Figure 1. Irwin argumentation model
Figure 2. Complete Attitudes narrative for Irwin
with the respective references previously entered. From
these, visual argumentation models were automatically gen-
erated for different attacker personas and their behavioural
variable types. Figure 1 illustrates the argumentation model
associated with Irwin’s Attitude characteristics.
D. Author Persona
Based on the skeleton provided by the persona char-
acteristic for each attacker persona’s behavioural type, a
narrative appealing to the characteristics in each section
was entered into CAIRIS, and a representative photograph
was associated with each persona. Figure 2 illustrates the
completed attitudes section associated with Irwin.
E. Applying Attacker Personas
Once an initial version of the webinos Context of Use De-
scription had been developed, a two day workshop was held
to review the analysis carried out. The workshop participants
were mobile application developers, security specialists, and
usability experts involved with the webinos project. As part
of this workshop, a focus group was held to review the
conventional personas in order to highlight unrealistic and
potentially exploitable user behaviours. Each persona was
presented individually and, where queries were raised about
individual behaviours, the argumentation structure was used
to justify and motivate the persona’s characteristics.
On the second day of the workshop, a similar focus
group session was carried out to review and discuss the
attacker personas. We found that discussing the attacker
personas using the same format as the non-attacker personas
was useful because session participants had, by this stage,
become attuned to the activities associated with validating
personas using their argumentation models. Consequently,
the participants were able to relate to the attackers with the
same ease as they related to the more conventional personas.
By the end of this session, all participants were clear about
the motives and capabilities of each of the attackers that
webinos would need to defend against.
Following this attacker persona focus group, one of the
security experts facilitated a session where a number of
attack trees [1] were developed; these modelled how unau-
thorised access to user data, application data, and sensitive
webinos APIs might be obtained, and how unauthorised use
of system resources might occur. During this exercise, the
attacker personas were frequently used to suggest certain
steps that might (or might not) be taken as part of an
attack. As well as re-grounding and validating the attacker
personas by using them in practice, this also rationalised
the attacker’s activities, thereby making the attacks more
believable to non-security participants. For example, one of
the steps in the attack tree stated “trick the user to use/install
Web application”. When thinking about how Irwin might
carry out such a step, situations were discussed where work
based inter-colleague trust relationship might be exploited.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a grounded approach for developing
attacker personas. We have also illustrated this approach
using a case study where attacker personas were developed
and used to support the development of a Context of
Use description for the EU FP7 webinos project. Attacker
personas are analogous to conventional personas, but differ
in the data sources upon which they are grounded. By
using open source data about convicted attackers and known
attacks, the personas are less biased by individual developer
beliefs, and more grounded in reality. Attacker personas
helped in focusing on the attackers’ characteristics a system
realistically has to face.
The grounding of attacker personas is based on three im-
portant characteristics : they are representative of known at-
tacker classes; they are representative of criminals convicted
for common online crimes; and they are situated within the
context of webinos by design and workshop discussions.
As a result, supplemental threat modelling artifacts appear
more realistic, because they are grounded in what a concrete
attacker can and is willing to do.
Future work will involve using both the attacker personas
and the supplemental analysis to motivate design decisions
underpinning the webinos security architecture.
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